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From: AL-KERNEL <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Subject: [CVE-2026-98500][LOW] HID: hid-oxp: use cancel_delayed_work_sync() in remove
Date: Sat, 24 Oct 2026 08:40:01 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)

CVE: CVE-2026-98500
Priority: LOW
AL-KERNEL base severity: LOW
KPANIC flag: NO
Patch: HID: hid-oxp: use cancel_delayed_work_sync() in remove
Commit: eed737d89fa368251018a62e1d698958ef7dc635
Upstream patch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=eed737d89fa368251018a62e1d698958ef7dc635
Original CVE announcement: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-98500
Analysis date: Sat, 24 Oct 2026 08:40:01 -0400
ActionableScore: 0
ActionableScore lower bound: unknown
Actionable bucket: Ordinary Moderate
Manual review required: NO

Summary:
A physical-removal race permits delayed HID work to access concurrently stopped device state, plausibly crashing the kernel without a demonstrated UAF or reusable corruption primitive.

======================================================================
ABOUT THIS REPORT
======================================================================

The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-98500 is available here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-98500

The original announcement does not normally provide a security severity
estimate, CVSS assessment, or enough information to determine whether the
reported kernel bug represents a practically relevant security issue.

This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel
vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin. It combines
an autonomous classifier with LLM-assisted technical analysis and a
separate ActionableScore mechanism.

The purpose of this report is to prioritize Linux kernel CVEs before
manual review, identify cases that require prompt investigation, and
support automatic closure of issues that are unlikely to have meaningful
security impact.

Published priority for this report: LOW
Manual review required: NO

A detailed explanation of the methodology and priority rules is included
at the end of this message.

======================================================================
AL-KERNEL CLASSIFICATION RESULT
======================================================================

CVE-2026-98500	LOW	https://www.kernelcve.org/list/?q=CVE-2026-98500 CHECK WITH IMPACT FROM ORIG NN LOW | AEGIS IMPACT MODERATE_KPANIC AEGIS_AS=1 LEGACY=LOW RESULT=DIFF TEMP_DISTANCE_MERGE_SKIP=AEGIS_NO_POSITIVE_SEVERITY_EVIDENCE (final Legacy and Aegis differ; FINAL: LOW, Aegis: MODERATE_KPANIC)	Maybe valid. Check manually. Hints by AL-KERNEL: The best (paranoid) CVSS is 'AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H';CWE-362;*CWE-672;CWE-667;Other CVSS 'AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H';BEST CVSS score: '5.3';DESCR 'A teardown race in hid oxp allows an already running delayed work callback to continue while hid_hw_close and hid_hw_stop dismantle the HID device state. The demonstrated impact is loss of availability through invalid post teardown device access with a possible kernel crash. A concrete UAF object or arbitrary memory access primitive is not established, although concurrent lower transport cleanup makes a limited memory safety consequence plausible enough for manual review. For the CVSS the PR:N value applies to physical device removal because no software privilege is required, while software initiated driver unbind normally requires administrative access. Physical access and race timing are required, so the issue is not remotely reachable. Automated impact decision path. The original SimpleNet classifier selected LOW. The primary LLM estimated paranoid CVSS 5.3 and the production ActionableScore returned 0 with recommendation Ordinary Moderate. The production rules then evaluated CVSS thresholds and ActionableScore thresholds. Recorded rule transitions were final reconciliation stage LOW to LOW because KP specialist did not establish a qualifying panic and the cross model evidence reconciliation rule was applied. The legacy KP specialist has no review artifact for this run. The legacy FD or DH downgrade specialist has no review artifact for this run. Exact triggered rule markers were KPANIC_UNSUPPORTED_REMOVED and V64_AEGIS_UNSUPPORTED_PROMOTION_BLOCKED. The independent weaker Aegis shadow evaluated CVSS 1.9 and ActionableScore 1 with primitive class CLASS_C and manual review REQUIRED. Its independently reconciled impact was MODERATE_KPANIC. The models disagreed but the aggregation rules retained the production result. The final reported impact is LOW.';YES REQUIRES MANUAL CHECK; ,and ActionableScore result is Ordinary Moderate (with actual score 0)	MAYBE	USB INIT SIMPLEFIX HARDWARE LINUS KPANIC_UNSUPPORTED_REMOVED V64_AEGIS_UNSUPPORTED_PROMOTION_BLOCKED	-	-	checked

======================================================================
ACTIONABLESCORE ANALYSIS
======================================================================

ActionableScore=0
PrimitiveClass=CLASS_C
RealUAF=NO
HostAdminRequired=NO
NamespaceScopedPrivilege=NO
ImportantCandidate=NO
ManualReview=RECOMMENDED
AutoDowngradeAllowed=YES
RequiresHostUID0=NO
AuthorizationDecisionBypass=NO
ProtectedResourceImpact=NONE
B4PendingReview=NO
B4PendingConfirmed=NO

1. ActionableScore

* Raw base score: -2.
* Conservative score: 0, applying the score’s lower bound.
* Raw paranoid score: -1.
* Paranoid score: 0, applying the score’s lower bound.
* Final recommended bucket: **Ordinary Moderate**::

2. Signal breakdown

* +1 reliable kernel crash/strong DoS: a running delayed-work callback can access HID state concurrently with `hid_hw_close()` and `hid_hw_stop()`, plausibly causing an invalid access or kernel fault.
* -1 hard/special timing: removal must overlap an already-running callback; supplied evidence characterizes this as a physical-removal race with high attack complexity.
* -2 physical/uncommon hardware path: the below-host-admin trigger requires physical removal of a supported OneXPlayer HID device. Software driver unbind normally requires administration.
* Paranoid +1 weak indirect corruption concern: callbacks may access lower transport/device state while it is being dismantled. This is not a confirmed UAF or concrete write primitive.
* No UAF bonus: the patch does not show that `hdev`, driver data, or another exact object is freed before callback use.
* No strong corruption, controlled reclaim, arbitrary access, confidentiality, integrity, or additional availability point is supported.
* NEW52/B5-R, NEW53/B3-PENDING, and NEW54/B4-PENDING do not apply.

3. Reachability analysis

Physical device removal provides a supported trigger without host UID 0 or host-administrator powers. The alternative software-unbind path is normally administrative. No namespace capability path exists. The affected hardware and a callback/removal overlap are required; repeatable attacker control over that overlap is not shown.

4. Primitive and severity reading

The proven defect is failure to synchronize delayed work with HID teardown. It exposes active but closing/stopped device state to an in-progress callback, rather than establishing post-free use of a particular object. This is CLASS_C crash/invalid-state behavior. A transport-specific UAF or memory corruption is conceivable but not evidenced by the supplied callback bodies or teardown internals. Consequently, this is not an Important candidate and may be downgraded after review.

5. One-sentence report phrase

A physical-removal race permits delayed HID work to access concurrently stopped device state, plausibly crashing the kernel without a demonstrated UAF or reusable corruption primitive.

6. Manual review advice

MANUAL CHECK RECOMMENDED

Confirm callback operations and lower HID transport teardown semantics for any concrete post-free access.

7. Call-site confidence

Call-site confidence: medium

======================================================================
UPSTREAM PATCH SUMMARY
======================================================================

Patch: HID: hid-oxp: use cancel_delayed_work_sync() in remove
Commit: eed737d89fa368251018a62e1d698958ef7dc635
Upstream URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=eed737d89fa368251018a62e1d698958ef7dc635

Commit description:

oxp_hid_remove() uses cancel_delayed_work() for all three delayed work
items.  cancel_delayed_work() only dequeues a pending work item without
waiting for a currently executing callback to finish.  If any of the
work callbacks (oxp_rgb_queue_fn, oxp_btn_queue_fn, oxp_mcu_init_fn) is
running at the time of removal, the callback continues executing
concurrently with hid_hw_close() and hid_hw_stop(), accessing the HID
device after it has been closed and stopped.

Use cancel_delayed_work_sync() instead to ensure that any in-progress
work callback completes before device teardown proceeds.

Fixes: 84910c4 ("HID: hid-oxp: Add OneXPlayer configuration driver")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Derek J. Clark <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Changed files:
  drivers/hid/hid-oxp.c

Diff excerpt:

Not included in this email. See the upstream URL for the full patch.

Full patch:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=eed737d89fa368251018a62e1d698958ef7dc635

======================================================================
DETAILED REPORT METHODOLOGY
======================================================================

The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-98500 can be found here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-98500

The original CVE announcement normally does not include a security-level
estimate. In particular, it may not contain a CVSS assessment, an impact
level, or enough information to determine whether the reported bug is a
practically relevant security issue. One purpose of this parallel CVE list
is to provide that missing technical and prioritization information.

The original goal of the AL-KERNEL project was to prioritize Linux kernel
CVE analysis automatically before manual review. The system can also help
identify non-security issues that may be suitable for automatic closure.

This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel
vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin.

The first analysis stage combines an autonomous classifier with additional
LLM-based analysis. The autonomous classifier runs locally on a CPU and is
based on a backpropagation neural network. Together, these mechanisms
produce a technical vulnerability description, identify likely weakness
types, estimate CVSS severity, and provide input for ActionableScore.

Two CVSS estimates are retained because incomplete kernel vulnerability
information often permits more than one defensible interpretation:

  Conservative CVSS vector: AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
  The Best / paranoid CVSS vector: AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H
  The Best / paranoid CVSS score: 5.3

The conservative vector represents a lower-impact interpretation.
The Best/paranoid vector intentionally represents a plausible upper-bound
interpretation and should not automatically be treated as demonstrated
real-world impact.

CVSS may also need to be adjusted for a particular Linux deployment,
because actual reachability, privileges, enabled kernel configuration,
hardware, namespaces, exposed device nodes, and other environmental
conditions can differ significantly between systems.

A separate ActionableScore mechanism evaluates practical remediation
urgency. Its analysis may include reachability, attack prerequisites,
subsystem exposure, memory-corruption characteristics, denial-of-service
reliability, and possible confidentiality, integrity, or
privilege-escalation impact.

  Conservative ActionableScore: unknown
  Paranoid ActionableScore: 0

The final base severity is taken directly from the second tab-separated
field of the AL-KERNEL classification result. ActionableScore does not
replace or independently override that final AL-KERNEL decision, and
if ActionableScore adjusted impact level of ALKERNEL, then you would see
self-readable flags above like INCREASED_TO_HIGH_BASED_ON_ACTIONABLESCOREHIGHEREQTHAN7.

For an AL-KERNEL result of MODERATE, this report uses the following
additional presentation split:

  ActionableScore below 5   -> MODERATE REGULAR
  ActionableScore 5 or more -> MODERATE 7.0

The distinction between MODERATE REGULAR and MODERATE 7.0 makes it
possible to identify Moderate issues that should receive manual analysis
and fixes before lower-priority MODERATE REGULAR issues. In many cases,
MODERATE REGULAR fixes may wait for a later rebase or routine update.

There is one override in which MODERATE REGULAR becomes MODERATE 7.0
even when the ActionableScore is below 5. When the AL-KERNEL result
contains the KPANIC flag, a MODERATE result is always presented as
MODERATE 7.0. The KPANIC flag selected with few regexps without
usage of AI at all, so it helps to detect cases when Kernel Crash happens
and similar (to filter False-Negative results from the LLM usage).

KPANIC indicates that a reliable kernel crash, kernel panic, or similarly
serious kernel availability impact was identified by the classification
workflow.

AL-KERNEL base severity for this report: LOW
KPANIC detected for this report: NO
Published priority for this report (same as in Subject): LOW

These results are intended to support engineering triage. They are
machine-generated estimates, and cases marked for manual review should
be validated by a human security engineer before final disposition.
For more info read docs linked from here: https://kernelcve.org/
(and you can submit you own patch there to generate such a report
for non-existant CVE-id yet).

Note that in many cases this AI tool selects higher severity, than
real is (means you can expect Importants instead of Moderate 7.0 or
Moderates 7.0 instead of regular Moderates). If you see such cases,
please use reply email interface to add additional manual analyses
info to this particular CVE.
And please, please, let me know when you see Lows instead of Importants
or Important instead of Low (because particular for such cases I
need to tune this AI tool to make it better for this one and next similar).
My contact email for such notifications is [email protected] (and both
send reply to CVE record itself too and see "reply" button below for howto reply).

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-10-24 12:40 UTC|newest]

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