From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: AL-KERNEL To: kernel-cve@kernelcve.org Subject: [CVE-2026-93185][MODERATE REGULAR] ASoC: rt700-sdw: always drain jack work on remove [ Upstream Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 23:35:26 -0400 Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-AL-KERNEL-CVE: CVE-2026-93185 X-AL-KERNEL-Priority: MODERATE REGULAR X-AL-KERNEL-Severity: MODERATE REGULAR X-AL-KERNEL-Base-Severity: MODERATE X-AL-KERNEL-KPANIC: NO X-AL-KERNEL-ActionableScore: 4 X-AL-KERNEL-ActionableScore-Lower: unknown X-AL-KERNEL-Commit: f1e21b7b977f5ae2955ecf3ab144da2578a4fe00 List-Id: CVE: CVE-2026-93185 Priority: MODERATE REGULAR AL-KERNEL base severity: MODERATE KPANIC flag: NO Patch: ASoC: rt700-sdw: always drain jack work on remove [ Upstream Commit: f1e21b7b977f5ae2955ecf3ab144da2578a4fe00 Upstream patch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=f1e21b7b977f5ae2955ecf3ab144da2578a4fe00 Original CVE announcement: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-93185 Analysis date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 23:35:26 -0400 ActionableScore: 4 ActionableScore lower bound: unknown Actionable bucket: Borderline / manual review recommended Manual review required: YES Summary: No one-sentence report phrase was found. ====================================================================== ABOUT THIS REPORT ====================================================================== The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-93185 is available here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-93185 The original announcement does not normally provide a security severity estimate, CVSS assessment, or enough information to determine whether the reported kernel bug represents a practically relevant security issue. This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin. It combines an autonomous classifier with LLM-assisted technical analysis and a separate ActionableScore mechanism. The purpose of this report is to prioritize Linux kernel CVEs before manual review, identify cases that require prompt investigation, and support automatic closure of issues that are unlikely to have meaningful security impact. Published priority for this report: MODERATE REGULAR Manual review required: YES A detailed explanation of the methodology and priority rules is included at the end of this message. ====================================================================== AL-KERNEL CLASSIFICATION RESULT ====================================================================== CVE-2026-93185 MODERATE https://www.kernelcve.org/list/?q=CVE-2026-93185 CHECK WITH IMPACT FROM ORIG NN LOW Maybe valid. Check manually. Hints by AL-KERNEL: The best (paranoid) CVSS is 'AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H';CWE-362;*CWE-416;*CWE-664;Other CVSS 'AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H';BEST CVSS score: '5.8';DESCR 'A lifecycle race in rt700_sdw_remove() can leave delayed jack work active because cleanup was gated on the mutable hw_init state. If hw_init is cleared after a SoundWire UNATTACHED status while jack_detect_work or jack_btn_check_work is already queued, remove can skip draining the work item. This creates a use-after-free candidate because the delayed work may later run against codec private data whose lifetime is ending. For the CVSS the PR:L is used in the paranoid score to cover systems where a local user or delegated service can influence audio jack state, runtime device removal, or SoundWire state transitions without full host administrator control. The issue is not network reachable. Impact is at least local denial of service via kernel warning, active timer use after remove, or crash. In worst case it may allow limited confidentiality or integrity impact due to a UAF candidate and should be reviewed manually.';YES REQUIRES MANUAL CHECK; ,and ActionableScore result is Borderline / manual review recommended (with actual score 4) YES INIT RACE HARDWARE INCREASED_FROM_LOW_BASED_ON_REQUIREMANUALCHECK DECREASED_TO_MODERATEREG_BASED_ON_FALSEPOSCHECKOFKP NO NO checked ====================================================================== ACTIONABLESCORE ANALYSIS ====================================================================== ActionableScore=4 PrimitiveClass=CLASS_B RealUAF=YES HostAdminRequired=UNKNOWN NamespaceScopedPrivilege=NO ImportantCandidate=NO ManualReview=RECOMMENDED AutoDowngradeAllowed=YES 1. ActionableScore * Raw conservative score: 2 * Conservative score: 4 * Raw paranoid score: 3 * Paranoid score: 4 * Applied conservative floor/cap: Real UAF floor 4 applied because an async work object can survive remove and later use codec private state after lifetime end. 2 -> 4 * Applied paranoid floor/cap: Real UAF floor 4 applied for the same lifetime reason. 3 -> 4 * Final recommended bucket: **Borderline / manual review recommended**:: 2. Signal breakdown Positive signals: * +2 Real UAF / active lifetime violation: jack_detect_work and jack_btn_check_work can remain queued when rt700_sdw_remove() skips cancellation after hw_init was cleared by the UNATTACHED path. The work objects are tied to rt700 private lifetime and may execute after remove. * +1 Reliable crash / strong DoS: if delayed work runs after codec private data teardown, a kernel warning, invalid work/timer state, Oops, or crash is realistic. Negative signals: * -1 conservative only for hard or unresolved teardown ordering: the commit explicitly says practical reachability depends on SoundWire core remove ordering after UNATTACHED and may be defensive if that ordering cannot occur on current systems. Non-awarded material signals: * Controlled reclaim not demonstrated. * Arbitrary or directed kernel write not demonstrated. * Confidentiality and integrity impact not awarded because no disclosure, controlled replacement, callback control, or useful post-free field consumption is shown. * Structured stale-object leverage not awarded because the demonstrated issue is an async cleanup/remove lifetime bug and the visible evidence is active delayed work after remove. * Weak LPE not awarded merely because this is a UAF candidate. * Extra Availability not awarded because the same potential crash is already counted. * Concrete repeated release/refcount signal not awarded. There is no visible first put/free followed by a second lifetime-mutating put/free on the exact same dangling reference. * FLOOR 5 not applied because there is no concrete repeated lifetime mutation, no controlled reclaim, and no established meaningful exploitation surface beyond delayed work after remove. Repeated release/refcount check: * First release can end lifetime: not established as a repeated-release pattern. * Exact same reference survives to second lifetime mutation: not established. * Second operation is a real lifetime/refcount mutation: not established. * +1 Concrete repeated release/refcount awarded: no. * Paranoid repeated-refcount leverage awarded: no. * FLOOR 5 applied: no. 3. Reachability analysis The apparent trigger is local or device-state mediated, not network reachable. The relevant sequence is that jack work is queued while the codec is initialized, SoundWire status later clears hw_init on UNATTACHED, and remove then skips draining the queued work. A normal remote attacker cannot reach this path. Ordinary local unprivileged reachability is not positively established either, because the complete sequence may depend on SoundWire device state, driver remove ordering, hardware events, runtime power/device teardown, or privileged device management. Host administrator privilege is also not positively established from the supplied patch alone, so HostAdminRequired is UNKNOWN rather than YES. Namespace-scoped privilege is not relevant here. There is no network namespace, user namespace, or container-scoped capability path shown. Prior hardware or platform support for the RT700 SoundWire codec is a deployment prerequisite, but no rare-hardware penalty is applied merely because the bug is in a driver. Race repeatability is uncertain. The supplied QEMU PoC can queue work, simulate UNATTACHED, and enter remove, but the commit itself says current-system reachability depends on SoundWire core ordering. That supports a conservative timing/reachability penalty, not a complete dismissal. 4. Primitive and severity interpretation The exact primitive is an async work lifetime mismatch. A delayed work item can remain active after the remove path because cancellation was incorrectly guarded by rt700->hw_init, a mutable hardware state flag. The work object is active structured kernel state, not a fixed DMA buffer, but the demonstrated use is tied to remove/teardown. This is CLASS_B because it is a real lifetime/UAF-style bug involving delayed work that may run after the lifetime of codec-private data is ending. It is not CLASS_A because there is no controlled reclaim, attacker-shaped replacement object, function-pointer or callback hijack, directed write, credential manipulation, or demonstrated privilege escalation. The demonstrated consequence is an active timer/work object after remove as detected by DEBUG_OBJECTS. The practical consequence is local DoS through warning, Oops, or crash if the work executes after teardown. Stronger confidentiality or integrity consequences are speculative and not scored. ImportantCandidate is NO because the available evidence supports a constrained async cleanup/remove UAF candidate with uncertain reachability and no meaningful exploitation leverage beyond crash. AutoDowngradeAllowed is YES because no concrete repeated refcount mutation, security-boundary bypass, controlled corruption, or unresolved strong exploitation primitive is established. ManualReview remains RECOMMENDED because it is still a real kernel lifetime bug and the SoundWire ordering question should be checked. Likely operational severity: borderline Moderate. It should not be treated as a high-end Important issue from this patch alone. 5. One-sentence report phrase A lifecycle bug in rt700_sdw_remove() can leave delayed jack work active after SoundWire UNATTACHED clears hw_init, creating a possible post-remove use of codec private data and a local DoS risk with uncertain practical reachability. 6. Manual review recommendation MANUAL CHECK RECOMMENDED Reason: this is a real async work lifetime issue with a plausible UAF/crash path, but practical triggerability depends on SoundWire remove ordering and no exploitation primitive beyond DoS is established. 7. Call-site confidence Call-site confidence: medium ====================================================================== UPSTREAM PATCH SUMMARY ====================================================================== Patch: ASoC: rt700-sdw: always drain jack work on remove [ Upstream Commit: f1e21b7b977f5ae2955ecf3ab144da2578a4fe00 Upstream URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=f1e21b7b977f5ae2955ecf3ab144da2578a4fe00 Changed files: sound/soc/codecs/rt700-sdw.c Diff excerpt: Not included in this email. See the upstream URL for the full patch. Full patch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=f1e21b7b977f5ae2955ecf3ab144da2578a4fe00 ====================================================================== DETAILED REPORT METHODOLOGY ====================================================================== The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-93185 can be found here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-93185 The original CVE announcement normally does not include a security-level estimate. In particular, it may not contain a CVSS assessment, an impact level, or enough information to determine whether the reported bug is a practically relevant security issue. One purpose of this parallel CVE list is to provide that missing technical and prioritization information. The original goal of the AL-KERNEL project was to prioritize Linux kernel CVE analysis automatically before manual review. The system can also help identify non-security issues that may be suitable for automatic closure. This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin. The first analysis stage combines an autonomous classifier with additional LLM-based analysis. The autonomous classifier runs locally on a CPU and is based on a backpropagation neural network. Together, these mechanisms produce a technical vulnerability description, identify likely weakness types, estimate CVSS severity, and provide input for ActionableScore. Two CVSS estimates are retained because incomplete kernel vulnerability information often permits more than one defensible interpretation: Conservative CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H The Best / paranoid CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H The Best / paranoid CVSS score: 5.8 The conservative vector represents a lower-impact interpretation. The Best/paranoid vector intentionally represents a plausible upper-bound interpretation and should not automatically be treated as demonstrated real-world impact. CVSS may also need to be adjusted for a particular Linux deployment, because actual reachability, privileges, enabled kernel configuration, hardware, namespaces, exposed device nodes, and other environmental conditions can differ significantly between systems. A separate ActionableScore mechanism evaluates practical remediation urgency. Its analysis may include reachability, attack prerequisites, subsystem exposure, memory-corruption characteristics, denial-of-service reliability, and possible confidentiality, integrity, or privilege-escalation impact. Conservative ActionableScore: unknown Paranoid ActionableScore: 4 The final base severity is taken directly from the second tab-separated field of the AL-KERNEL classification result. ActionableScore does not replace or independently override that final AL-KERNEL decision, and if ActionableScore adjusted impact level of ALKERNEL, then you would see self-readable flags above like INCREASED_TO_HIGH_BASED_ON_ACTIONABLESCOREHIGHEREQTHAN7. For an AL-KERNEL result of MODERATE, this report uses the following additional presentation split: ActionableScore below 5 -> MODERATE REGULAR ActionableScore 5 or more -> MODERATE 7.0 The distinction between MODERATE REGULAR and MODERATE 7.0 makes it possible to identify Moderate issues that should receive manual analysis and fixes before lower-priority MODERATE REGULAR issues. In many cases, MODERATE REGULAR fixes may wait for a later rebase or routine update. There is one override in which MODERATE REGULAR becomes MODERATE 7.0 even when the ActionableScore is below 5. When the AL-KERNEL result contains the KPANIC flag, a MODERATE result is always presented as MODERATE 7.0. The KPANIC flag selected with few regexps without usage of AI at all, so it helps to detect cases when Kernel Crash happens and similar (to filter False-Negative results from the LLM usage). KPANIC indicates that a reliable kernel crash, kernel panic, or similarly serious kernel availability impact was identified by the classification workflow. AL-KERNEL base severity for this report: MODERATE KPANIC detected for this report: NO Published priority for this report (same as in Subject): MODERATE REGULAR These results are intended to support engineering triage. They are machine-generated estimates, and cases marked for manual review should be validated by a human security engineer before final disposition. For more info read docs linked from here: https://kernelcve.org/ (and you can submit you own patch there to generate such a report for non-existant CVE-id yet). Note that in many cases this AI tool selects higher severity, than real is (means you can expect Importants instead of Moderate 7.0 or Moderates 7.0 instead of regular Moderates). If you see such cases, please use reply email interface to add additional manual analyses info to this particular CVE. And please, please, let me know when you see Lows instead of Importants or Important instead of Low (because particular for such cases I need to tune this AI tool to make it better for this one and next similar). My contact email for such notifications is alexanjelausa@gmail.com (and both send reply to CVE record itself too and see "reply" button below for howto reply).