From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: AL-KERNEL To: kernel-cve@kernelcve.org Subject: [CVE-2026-63923][IMPORTANT] octeontx2-af: validate body pcifunc in rvu_mbox_handler_rep_event_notify Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2026 18:10:31 -0400 Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-AL-KERNEL-CVE: CVE-2026-63923 X-AL-KERNEL-Priority: IMPORTANT X-AL-KERNEL-Severity: IMPORTANT X-AL-KERNEL-Base-Severity: IMPORTANT X-AL-KERNEL-KPANIC: YES X-AL-KERNEL-ActionableScore: 8 X-AL-KERNEL-ActionableScore-Lower: 7 X-AL-KERNEL-Commit: 68be0260e2a02ff9b18a8678d5f8d1715fa20138 List-Id: CVE: CVE-2026-63923 Priority: IMPORTANT AL-KERNEL base severity: IMPORTANT KPANIC flag: YES Patch: octeontx2-af: validate body pcifunc in rvu_mbox_handler_rep_event_notify Commit: 68be0260e2a02ff9b18a8678d5f8d1715fa20138 Upstream patch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=68be0260e2a02ff9b18a8678d5f8d1715fa20138 Original CVE announcement: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-63923 Analysis date: Sun, 19 Jul 2026 18:10:31 -0400 ActionableScore: 8 ActionableScore lower bound: 7 Actionable bucket: Strong Important candidate / Actionable Moderate at minimum Manual review required: YES Summary: A VF-reachable OcteonTX2 AF representor mailbox bug allows a sender-controlled nested pcifunc to drive out-of-bounds PF/VF indexing and a six-byte attacker-controlled kernel OOB write, making this a strong manual-review candidate despite hardware and switchdev configuration requirements. ====================================================================== ABOUT THIS REPORT ====================================================================== The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-63923 is available here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-63923 The original announcement does not normally provide a security severity estimate, CVSS assessment, or enough information to determine whether the reported kernel bug represents a practically relevant security issue. This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin. It combines an autonomous classifier with LLM-assisted technical analysis and a separate ActionableScore mechanism. The purpose of this report is to prioritize Linux kernel CVEs before manual review, identify cases that require prompt investigation, and support automatic closure of issues that are unlikely to have meaningful security impact. Published priority for this report: IMPORTANT Manual review required: YES A detailed explanation of the methodology and priority rules is included at the end of this message. ====================================================================== AL-KERNEL CLASSIFICATION RESULT ====================================================================== CVE-2026-63923 IMPORTANT CHECK WITH IMPACT FROM ORIG NN IMPORTANT Maybe valid. Check manually. Hints by AL-KERNEL: The best (paranoid) CVSS is 'AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H';*CWE-787;CWE-129;*CWE-20;Other CVSS 'AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H';BEST CVSS score: '7.8';DESCR 'An out of bounds write in the octeontx2 AF representor mailbox path occurs because rvu_mbox_handler_rep_event_notify queues a sender controlled nested rep_event pcifunc without validating that it names a valid PF or VF. A VF can reach this path when the parent PF is in switchdev representor mode, and the later worker uses the body pcifunc for rvu pf or hwvf indexing and for the AF to PF mailbox target. For RVU_EVENT_MAC_ADDR_CHANGE this can become a six byte attacker controlled OOB ether_addr_copy target in rvu_rep_wq_handler, which is a memory corruption primitive rather than a pure crash. For the CVSS the PR:L is used for the paranoid score because an attacker needs local or guest side access to a VF mailbox path, but does not need full host administrator privileges. The issue is not directly reachable from the external network by ordinary packets. Impact is at least local denial of service and may include confidentiality, integrity, and privilege escalation risk because the patch context shows attacker controlled out of bounds kernel memory write.';YES REQUIRES MANUAL CHECK; ,and ActionableScore result is Strong Important candidate / Actionable Moderate at minimum (with actual score 8) YES REMOTE WRITE KASAN OOB NETWORK HARDWARE LINUS KPANIC YES NO checked ====================================================================== ACTIONABLESCORE ANALYSIS ====================================================================== ActionableScore=8 ActionableScoreLower=7 ## 1. ActionableScore * Conservative score: 7 * Paranoid score: 8 * Final recommended bucket: **Strong Important candidate / Actionable Moderate at minimum**:: ## 2. Signal breakdown Triggered signals: * Local or guest-side low-privilege trigger: +1 A VF can reach the AF mailbox path when its parent PF is in switchdev representor mode. This is not ordinary Internet reachability, but it can be reachable from a guest or tenant with VF access. * Privilege escalation plausible: +2 The patch context describes an attacker-controlled out-of-range `pcifunc` that can select an out-of-bounds PF/VF object and produce a controlled six-byte write. This is a plausible LPE or host-impact primitive, not just a crash. * Memory corruption, strong corruption primitive: +2 KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds write in `rvu_rep_wq_handler`, and the write payload for `RVU_EVENT_MAC_ADDR_CHANGE` is attacker-chosen through `ether_addr_copy`. * Reliable kernel crash / strong DoS: +1 The described OOB write is KASAN-detected and can realistically crash the kernel or corrupt trusted driver state. * Privileged kernel/device-management memory corruption path: +1 The corruption occurs in the AF/PF representor mailbox and worker path, a highly trusted device-management context. * Confidentiality impact plausible: +1 Because this is real kernel memory corruption with attacker-influenced object selection, confidentiality impact cannot be ruled out in triage. * Integrity impact plausible: +1 The write primitive directly modifies kernel memory and may corrupt trusted driver or adjacent heap objects. Subtractors: * Rare hardware and configuration dependency: -1 conservative The issue requires Marvell OcteonTX2 hardware and PF switchdev representor mode. This limits broad exposure but does not make the primitive low-risk where deployed. * Constrained write shape: -1 conservative The described write is six bytes, not an arbitrary-length overwrite. This constrains exploitation, but the target is influenced by attacker-controlled `pcifunc`. Paranoid adjustment: * The paranoid score removes some constraint discount because the target selection is attacker-influenced and the corruption occurs asynchronously in a trusted worker context. ## 3. Reachability analysis The bug is not directly reachable from the external network by normal packets. It is reachable through the VF-to-AF mailbox path when a VF is attached to a PF configured in switchdev representor mode. A malicious or compromised guest, tenant, or local actor with VF access may be able to send the malformed `REP_EVENT_NOTIFY` body. Namespaces do not directly expose this path by themselves, but SR-IOV VF assignment to guests or containers can reduce the practical privilege boundary. The attacker should not be treated as full host root if the VF is delegated to a less trusted guest or tenant. The path is hardware-specific and configuration-dependent, but realistic in environments using OcteonTX2 representors, SR-IOV, or switchdev networking. ## 4. Severity interpretation This behaves more like an Important-class candidate than an ordinary Moderate issue. The strongest evidence is the concrete KASAN-reported slab OOB write with attacker-controlled six-byte data and attacker-influenced object selection. Theoretical impact includes kernel memory corruption and possible privilege escalation or host compromise. Realistic exploitation is constrained by hardware, switchdev representor configuration, VF access, and the limited write size. Even with those constraints, this should not be auto-closed as a routine DoS because the primitive is stronger than a NULL dereference or resource leak. ## 5. One-sentence report phrase A VF-reachable OcteonTX2 AF representor mailbox bug allows a sender-controlled nested pcifunc to drive out-of-bounds PF/VF indexing and a six-byte attacker-controlled kernel OOB write, making this a strong manual-review candidate despite hardware and switchdev configuration requirements. ## 6. Manual review recommendation MANUAL CHECK REQUIRED Reason: the patch describes a concrete attacker-controlled OOB write in a trusted device-management worker path, with possible guest-to-host or tenant-to-host impact in VF delegation deployments. ====================================================================== UPSTREAM PATCH SUMMARY ====================================================================== Patch: octeontx2-af: validate body pcifunc in rvu_mbox_handler_rep_event_notify Commit: 68be0260e2a02ff9b18a8678d5f8d1715fa20138 Upstream URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=68be0260e2a02ff9b18a8678d5f8d1715fa20138 Commit description: rvu_mbox_handler_rep_event_notify() in drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/ octeontx2/af/rvu_rep.c queues a sender-controlled REP_EVENT_NOTIFY request body verbatim, and rvu_rep_up_notify() then forwards event->pcifunc (the nested body field, distinct from the AF-normalised header pcifunc) into rvu_get_pfvf(), rvu_get_pf() and the AF->PF mailbox device index without any bounds check. A VF attached to a PF that has been put into switchdev representor mode reaches this path: the VF mailbox handler otx2_pfvf_mbox_handler() forwards every message id including MBOX_MSG_REP_EVENT_NOTIFY to AF without an allowlist, and the AF dispatcher rewrites only msg->pcifunc, leaving struct rep_event::pcifunc attacker-controlled. The sibling rvu_mbox_handler_esw_cfg() refuses requests whose header pcifunc is not rvu->rep_pcifunc; this handler has no equivalent gate. An out-of-range body pcifunc selects an &rvu->pf[]/&rvu->hwvf[] element past the allocated array and, for RVU_EVENT_MAC_ADDR_CHANGE, turns into a six-byte attacker-chosen OOB ether_addr_copy() target inside the queued worker; KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds write in rvu_rep_wq_handler. Reject malformed requests at the handler entry by gating on is_pf_func_valid(), which is already the canonical PF/VF range check in this driver; expose it via rvu.h so callers in rvu_rep.c can use it instead of open-coding the same range arithmetic. Fixes: b8fea84 ("octeontx2-pf: Add support to sync link state between representor and VFs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260520154157.1439319-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Changed files: drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu.c drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu.h drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_rep.c Diff excerpt: Not included in this email. See the upstream URL for the full patch. Full patch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=68be0260e2a02ff9b18a8678d5f8d1715fa20138 ====================================================================== DETAILED REPORT METHODOLOGY ====================================================================== The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-63923 can be found here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-63923 The original CVE announcement normally does not include a security-level estimate. In particular, it may not contain a CVSS assessment, an impact level, or enough information to determine whether the reported bug is a practically relevant security issue. One purpose of this parallel CVE list is to provide that missing technical and prioritization information. The original goal of the AL-KERNEL project was to prioritize Linux kernel CVE analysis automatically before manual review. The system can also help identify non-security issues that may be suitable for automatic closure. This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin. The first analysis stage combines an autonomous classifier with additional LLM-based analysis. The autonomous classifier runs locally on a CPU and is based on a backpropagation neural network. Together, these mechanisms produce a technical vulnerability description, identify likely weakness types, estimate CVSS severity, and provide input for ActionableScore. Two CVSS estimates are retained because incomplete kernel vulnerability information often permits more than one defensible interpretation: Conservative CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H The Best / paranoid CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H The Best / paranoid CVSS score: 7.8 The conservative vector represents a lower-impact interpretation. The Best/paranoid vector intentionally represents a plausible upper-bound interpretation and should not automatically be treated as demonstrated real-world impact. CVSS may also need to be adjusted for a particular Linux deployment, because actual reachability, privileges, enabled kernel configuration, hardware, namespaces, exposed device nodes, and other environmental conditions can differ significantly between systems. A separate ActionableScore mechanism evaluates practical remediation urgency. Its analysis may include reachability, attack prerequisites, subsystem exposure, memory-corruption characteristics, denial-of-service reliability, and possible confidentiality, integrity, or privilege-escalation impact. Conservative ActionableScore: 7 Paranoid ActionableScore: 8 The final base severity is taken directly from the second tab-separated field of the AL-KERNEL classification result. ActionableScore does not replace or independently override that final AL-KERNEL decision, and if ActionableScore adjusted impact level of ALKERNEL, then you would see self-readable flags above like INCREASED_TO_HIGH_BASED_ON_ACTIONABLESCOREHIGHEREQTHAN7. For an AL-KERNEL result of MODERATE, this report uses the following additional presentation split: ActionableScore below 5 -> MODERATE REGULAR ActionableScore 5 or more -> MODERATE 7.0 The distinction between MODERATE REGULAR and MODERATE 7.0 makes it possible to identify Moderate issues that should receive manual analysis and fixes before lower-priority MODERATE REGULAR issues. In many cases, MODERATE REGULAR fixes may wait for a later rebase or routine update. There is one override in which MODERATE REGULAR becomes MODERATE 7.0 even when the ActionableScore is below 5. When the AL-KERNEL result contains the KPANIC flag, a MODERATE result is always presented as MODERATE 7.0. The KPANIC flag selected with few regexps without usage of AI at all, so it helps to detect cases when Kernel Crash happens and similar (to filter False-Negative results from the LLM usage). KPANIC indicates that a reliable kernel crash, kernel panic, or similarly serious kernel availability impact was identified by the classification workflow. AL-KERNEL base severity for this report: IMPORTANT KPANIC detected for this report: YES Published priority for this report (same as in Subject): IMPORTANT These results are intended to support engineering triage. They are machine-generated estimates, and cases marked for manual review should be validated by a human security engineer before final disposition. For more info read docs linked from here: https://kernelcve.org/ (and you can submit you own patch there to generate such a report for non-existant CVE-id yet). Note that in many cases this AI tool selects higher severity, than real is (means you can expect Importants instead of Moderate 7.0 or Moderates 7.0 instead of regular Moderates). If you see such cases, please use reply email interface to add additional manual analyses info to this particular CVE. And please, please, let me know when you see Lows instead of Importants or Important instead of Low (because particular for such cases I need to tune this AI tool to make it better for this one and next similar). My contact email for such notifications is alexanjelausa@gmail.com (and both send reply to CVE record itself too and see "reply" button below for howto reply).