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From: AL-KERNEL <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Subject: [CVE-2026-46060][LOW] crypto: qat - fix IRQ cleanup on 6xxx probe failure
Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 14:49:09 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)

CVE: CVE-2026-46060
Priority: LOW
AL-KERNEL base severity: LOW
KPANIC flag: NO
Patch: crypto: qat - fix IRQ cleanup on 6xxx probe failure
Commit: 27f561bf894e46bdc2d6209c50884adad79d8277
Upstream patch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=27f561bf894e46bdc2d6209c50884adad79d8277
Original CVE announcement: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-46060
Analysis date: Wed, 27 May 2026 14:49:09 -0400
ActionableScore: 0
ActionableScore lower bound: unknown
Actionable bucket: Ordinary Moderate / Low-like
Manual review required: NO

Summary:
No one-sentence report phrase was found.

======================================================================
ABOUT THIS REPORT
======================================================================

The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-46060 is available here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-46060

The original announcement does not normally provide a security severity
estimate, CVSS assessment, or enough information to determine whether the
reported kernel bug represents a practically relevant security issue.

This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel
vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin. It combines
an autonomous classifier with LLM-assisted technical analysis and a
separate ActionableScore mechanism.

The purpose of this report is to prioritize Linux kernel CVEs before
manual review, identify cases that require prompt investigation, and
support automatic closure of issues that are unlikely to have meaningful
security impact.

Published priority for this report: LOW
Manual review required: NO

A detailed explanation of the methodology and priority rules is included
at the end of this message.

======================================================================
AL-KERNEL CLASSIFICATION RESULT
======================================================================

CVE-2026-46060	LOW	CHECK	Maybe valid. Check manually. Hints by AL-KERNEL: The best (paranoid) CVSS is 'AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H';CWE-459;*CWE-772;CWE-404;CWE-703;Other CVSS 'AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L';BEST CVSS score: '4.1';DESCR 'IRQ handlers registered during adf_isr_resource_alloc can remain attached when adf_dev_up fails during QAT 6xxx probe. Devres then releases MSI-X vectors before the handlers are detached, causing leaked irq proc entries and potentially leaving the device cleanup state inconsistent. For the CVSS the PR:H is used because reliable triggering normally requires administrative control over PCI driver probing or a failing QAT device or firmware path. The issue is not network reachable and is not a user data plane bug. Impact is availability only through cleanup failure, warnings, and resource leakage during probe failure.';NO MANUAL CHECK; ,and ActionableScore result is Ordinary Moderate / Low-like (with actual score 0) 	MAYBE	WARNONLY LEAK HARDWARE 	-	-	checked

======================================================================
ACTIONABLESCORE ANALYSIS
======================================================================

ActionableScore=0

1. ActionableScore
* Conservative score: 0
* Paranoid score: 0
* Final recommended bucket: **Ordinary Moderate / Low-like**::

2. Signal breakdown
* Requires admin/root/device-management control in typical deployments: -2. Reliable triggering normally requires PCI driver probing, reprobe, device reset workflow, or a failing QAT hardware or firmware initialization path.
* Physical-only or rare hardware condition: -2. The issue is specific to Intel QAT 6xxx hardware and a probe-failure path.
* Availability/resource cleanup concern: +1. IRQ proc entries can be leaked and cleanup state can become inconsistent, but the patch context shows warnings and resource leakage rather than a reliable system-wide crash.
* Firmware-mediated external influence: +1, weakly applicable. A failing device or firmware path can contribute to the failure condition, but this is not a remote attacker-controlled protocol path.
* No memory corruption signal. The patch does not indicate UAF, double-free, OOB write, arbitrary write, stale pointer use, or attacker-controlled overwrite.

3. Reachability analysis
The bug is reachable during QAT 6xxx PCI probe when `adf_dev_up()` partially succeeds and then fails. In normal deployments, an attacker would need administrative control over driver binding/probing or influence over a physical/firmware failure condition. Containers and namespaces generally do not lower the privilege requirement because PCI device probing is host-admin controlled. The affected path is not default-reachable by ordinary users and is not network-triggerable.

4. Severity interpretation
This behaves like a Low-like or ordinary Moderate cleanup/resource-leak issue, not an actionable Moderate or Important vulnerability. The realistic impact is IRQ cleanup inconsistency and leaked `/proc/irq` entries on probe failure. There is no demonstrated memory corruption, privilege escalation, confidentiality impact, or integrity impact.

5. One-sentence report phrase
A QAT 6xxx probe-failure cleanup bug can leave IRQ handlers attached after MSI-X vectors are released, causing IRQ proc entry leaks and cleanup warnings, but it requires privileged device-management conditions and has no supported memory-corruption primitive.

6. Manual review recommendation
NO MANUAL CHECK NEEDED. This is a privileged, hardware-specific probe cleanup issue with no realistic unprivileged trigger, no network reachability, and no evidence of memory corruption or privilege escalation.

======================================================================
UPSTREAM PATCH SUMMARY
======================================================================

Patch: crypto: qat - fix IRQ cleanup on 6xxx probe failure
Commit: 27f561bf894e46bdc2d6209c50884adad79d8277
Upstream URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=27f561bf894e46bdc2d6209c50884adad79d8277

Commit description:

When adf_dev_up() partially completes and then fails, the IRQ
handlers registered during adf_isr_resource_alloc() are not detached
before the MSI-X vectors are released.

Since the device is enabled with pcim_enable_device(), calling
pci_alloc_irq_vectors() internally registers pcim_msi_release() as a
devres action. On probe failure, devres runs pcim_msi_release() which
calls pci_free_irq_vectors(), tearing down the MSI-X vectors while IRQ
handlers (for example 'qat0-bundle0') are still attached. This causes
remove_proc_entry() warnings:

    [   22.163964] remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'irq/143', leaking at least 'qat0-bundle0'

Moving the devm_add_action_or_reset() before adf_dev_up() does not solve
the problem since devres runs in LIFO order and pcim_msi_release(),
registered later inside adf_dev_up(), would still fire before
adf_device_down().

Fix by calling adf_dev_down() explicitly when adf_dev_up() fails, to
properly free IRQ handlers before devres releases the MSI-X vectors.

Fixes: 17fd751 ("crypto: qat - add qat_6xxx driver")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ahsan Atta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Laurent M Coquerel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Changed files:
  drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_6xxx/adf_drv.c

Diff excerpt:

Not included in this email. See the upstream URL for the full patch.

Full patch:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=27f561bf894e46bdc2d6209c50884adad79d8277

======================================================================
DETAILED REPORT METHODOLOGY
======================================================================

The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-46060 can be found here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-46060

The original CVE announcement normally does not include a security-level
estimate. In particular, it may not contain a CVSS assessment, an impact
level, or enough information to determine whether the reported bug is a
practically relevant security issue. One purpose of this parallel CVE list
is to provide that missing technical and prioritization information.

The original goal of the AL-KERNEL project was to prioritize Linux kernel
CVE analysis automatically before manual review. The system can also help
identify non-security issues that may be suitable for automatic closure.

This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel
vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin.

The first analysis stage combines an autonomous classifier with additional
LLM-based analysis. The autonomous classifier runs locally on a CPU and is
based on a backpropagation neural network. Together, these mechanisms
produce a technical vulnerability description, identify likely weakness
types, estimate CVSS severity, and provide input for ActionableScore.

Two CVSS estimates are retained because incomplete kernel vulnerability
information often permits more than one defensible interpretation:

  Conservative CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
  The Best / paranoid CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
  The Best / paranoid CVSS score: 4.1

The conservative vector represents a lower-impact interpretation.
The Best/paranoid vector intentionally represents a plausible upper-bound
interpretation and should not automatically be treated as demonstrated
real-world impact.

CVSS may also need to be adjusted for a particular Linux deployment,
because actual reachability, privileges, enabled kernel configuration,
hardware, namespaces, exposed device nodes, and other environmental
conditions can differ significantly between systems.

A separate ActionableScore mechanism evaluates practical remediation
urgency. Its analysis may include reachability, attack prerequisites,
subsystem exposure, memory-corruption characteristics, denial-of-service
reliability, and possible confidentiality, integrity, or
privilege-escalation impact.

  Conservative ActionableScore: unknown
  Paranoid ActionableScore: 0

The final base severity is taken directly from the second tab-separated
field of the AL-KERNEL classification result. ActionableScore does not
replace or independently override that final AL-KERNEL decision, and
if ActionableScore adjusted impact level of ALKERNEL, then you would see
self-readable flags above like INCREASED_TO_HIGH_BASED_ON_ACTIONABLESCOREHIGHEREQTHAN7.

For an AL-KERNEL result of MODERATE, this report uses the following
additional presentation split:

  ActionableScore below 5   -> MODERATE REGULAR
  ActionableScore 5 or more -> MODERATE 7.0

The distinction between MODERATE REGULAR and MODERATE 7.0 makes it
possible to identify Moderate issues that should receive manual analysis
and fixes before lower-priority MODERATE REGULAR issues. In many cases,
MODERATE REGULAR fixes may wait for a later rebase or routine update.

There is one override in which MODERATE REGULAR becomes MODERATE 7.0
even when the ActionableScore is below 5. When the AL-KERNEL result
contains the KPANIC flag, a MODERATE result is always presented as
MODERATE 7.0. The KPANIC flag selected with few regexps without
usage of AI at all, so it helps to detect cases when Kernel Crash happens
and similar (to filter False-Negative results from the LLM usage).

KPANIC indicates that a reliable kernel crash, kernel panic, or similarly
serious kernel availability impact was identified by the classification
workflow.

AL-KERNEL base severity for this report: LOW
KPANIC detected for this report: NO
Published priority for this report (same as in Subject): LOW

These results are intended to support engineering triage. They are
machine-generated estimates, and cases marked for manual review should
be validated by a human security engineer before final disposition.
For more info read docs linked from here: https://kernelcve.org/
(and you can submit you own patch there to generate such a report
for non-existant CVE-id yet).

Note that in many cases this AI tool selects higher severity, than
real is (means you can expect Importants instead of Moderate 7.0 or
Moderates 7.0 instead of regular Moderates). If you see such cases,
please use reply email interface to add additional manual analyses
info to this particular CVE.
And please, please, let me know when you see Lows instead of Importants
or Important instead of Low (because particular for such cases I
need to tune this AI tool to make it better for this one and next similar).
My contact email for such notifications is [email protected] (and both
send reply to CVE record itself too and see "reply" button below for howto reply).

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-05-27 18:49 UTC|newest]

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