From: AL-KERNEL <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Subject: [CVE-2024-53059][MODERATE REGULAR] wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: Fix response handling in iwl_mvm_send_recovery_cmd() [ Upstream
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2026 21:35:52 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)
CVE: CVE-2024-53059
Priority: MODERATE REGULAR
AL-KERNEL base severity: MODERATE
KPANIC flag: NO
Patch: wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: Fix response handling in iwl_mvm_send_recovery_cmd() [ Upstream
Commit: 9c98ee7ea463a838235e7a0e35851b38476364f2
Upstream patch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=9c98ee7ea463a838235e7a0e35851b38476364f2
Original CVE announcement: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2024-53059
Analysis date: Mon, 12 Oct 2026 21:35:52 -0400
ActionableScore: 1
ActionableScore lower bound: unknown
Actionable bucket: Ordinary Moderate
Manual review required: NO
Summary:
No one-sentence report phrase was found.
======================================================================
ABOUT THIS REPORT
======================================================================
The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2024-53059 is available here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2024-53059
The original announcement does not normally provide a security severity
estimate, CVSS assessment, or enough information to determine whether the
reported kernel bug represents a practically relevant security issue.
This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel
vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin. It combines
an autonomous classifier with LLM-assisted technical analysis and a
separate ActionableScore mechanism.
The purpose of this report is to prioritize Linux kernel CVEs before
manual review, identify cases that require prompt investigation, and
support automatic closure of issues that are unlikely to have meaningful
security impact.
Published priority for this report: MODERATE REGULAR
Manual review required: NO
A detailed explanation of the methodology and priority rules is included
at the end of this message.
======================================================================
AL-KERNEL CLASSIFICATION RESULT
======================================================================
CVE-2024-53059 MODERATE https://www.kernelcve.org/list/?q=CVE-2024-53059 CHECK WITH IMPACT FROM ORIG NN IMPORTANT | AEGIS IMPACT MODERATE_KPANIC AEGIS_AS=2 LEGACY=MODERATE RESULT=DIFF (independent Legacy and Aegis differ; FINAL: MODERATE, Aegis: MODERATE_KPANIC) Maybe valid. Check manually. Hints by AL-KERNEL: The best (paranoid) CVSS is 'AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H';CWE-125;*CWE-401;*CWE-20;Other CVSS 'AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L';BEST CVSS score: '5.3';DESCR 'The iwlwifi MVM recovery path reads a 32 bit status value from a firmware response without first validating that the response contains enough data. A truncated or malformed firmware reply can therefore cause an invalid or out of bounds read in kernel context, while the allocated response buffer is also retained after the command completes. The observed consequences are a possible driver or kernel failure and a separate memory leak that may accumulate if the recovery path can be triggered repeatedly. For the CVSS the PR:L reflects that reliable triggering is expected to require a local user or process able to exercise the wireless device or recovery path, while direct control of the malformed response may require abnormal or compromised firmware behavior. The issue is not demonstrated to be remotely reachable from ordinary WiFi traffic because the vulnerable data is returned by device firmware rather than copied directly from an over the air frame. Impact is primarily availability loss. The paranoid assessment also allows limited confidentiality impact from the invalid read, but no integrity impact is assigned because this path provides no write primitive.';YES REQUIRES MANUAL CHECK; ,and ActionableScore result is Ordinary Moderate (with actual score 1) MAYBE REMOTE SIMPLEFIX NETWORK SKB PACKET LOWERED_FROM_HIGH_BASED_ON_GUESSCVSS DECREASED_TO_MODERATEREG_BASED_ON_ACTIONABLESCORELESSTHAN4 - - checked
======================================================================
ACTIONABLESCORE ANALYSIS
======================================================================
ActionableScore=1
PrimitiveClass=CLASS_C
RealUAF=NO
HostAdminRequired=UNKNOWN
NamespaceScopedPrivilege=UNKNOWN
ImportantCandidate=NO
ManualReview=RECOMMENDED
AutoDowngradeAllowed=YES
RequiresHostUID0=UNKNOWN
AuthorizationDecisionBypass=NO
ProtectedResourceImpact=NONE
B4PendingReview=NO
B4PendingConfirmed=NO
1. ActionableScore
* Raw conservative score: 1
* Conservative score: 1
* Raw paranoid score: 1
* Paranoid score: 1
* No floor or cap was applied.
* Final recommended bucket: **Ordinary Moderate**::
2. Signal breakdown
Positive signals:
* +1 Concrete persistent kernel resource leak. `CMD_WANT_SKB` returns a response buffer, but the old path does not release it. The commit directly confirms this leak.
* +0 Limited heap OOB read. A response shorter than four bytes can make the direct `u32` load read beyond the valid response payload, but no user-visible disclosure, write, or independently useful control primitive is established.
Negative signals:
* No negative points applied. The analysis does not assume host-admin privilege, rare hardware, or difficult timing without evidence.
Important non-awarded signals:
* No reliable kernel crash point. The commit establishes missing length validation but does not demonstrate a panic or host-wide failure.
* No resource-exhaustion point. Repeatable attacker-controlled accumulation and host-wide exhaustion are not established.
* No confidentiality point. Bytes read outside the valid response are used internally as a status value and are not shown to be disclosed.
* No integrity point. There is no write primitive.
* No firmware-mediated exposure point. External traffic influencing the firmware is conceivable, but the supplied evidence does not connect attacker-controlled traffic to a malformed recovery response.
* No direct remote reachability. The vulnerable input is generated through firmware command handling rather than directly parsed from an over-the-air frame.
* NEW52 B5-R does not apply because there is no heap OOB write, retry-accumulated offset, or later consumption of corrupted written state.
* NEW53 B3-PENDING does not apply because there is no write to shared or file-backed storage.
* NEW54 B4-PENDING does not apply because no authorization decision or mandatory security check is involved.
3. Reachability analysis
The vulnerable operation occurs while the Intel iwlwifi MVM driver processes a firmware recovery command response. A malformed or truncated firmware response is required for the OOB read, while repeated recovery-command execution is required for meaningful leak accumulation.
The supplied evidence does not establish that an ordinary local user can force a short response, repeatedly trigger the precise recovery path, or control firmware response contents. It also does not establish that host-admin powers are required for the complete trigger. Therefore, `HostAdminRequired` remains `UNKNOWN`.
No namespace capability check or complete namespace-scoped trigger is shown, so `NamespaceScopedPrivilege` is `UNKNOWN`. Intel iwlwifi hardware and loaded firmware are prerequisites, but no physical attacker or unusual hardware condition is established. There is no race or timing requirement in the shown defect.
4. Primitive and severity interpretation
The exact primitives are:
* a bounded read of a 32-bit status from a response whose payload length was not validated;
* a concrete response-buffer leak caused by omitting the corresponding release.
This is not a UAF, double release, refcount mutation, OOB write, controlled overwrite, or authorization bypass. The invalid read may consume bytes beyond the valid packet payload as an ordinary status value, but no disclosure or security-sensitive control-flow consequence is demonstrated. The leak is concrete, but attacker-controlled repetition and host-wide exhaustion remain unresolved.
`PrimitiveClass=CLASS_C` is appropriate because the demonstrated behavior is limited to an invalid read, incorrect status consumption, and resource retention without an independently useful corruption primitive. `ImportantCandidate=NO` because no Class A or meaningful Class B primitive exists. `AutoDowngradeAllowed=YES` because the remaining uncertainty concerns triggerability and operational availability rather than unresolved exploitation leverage.
Likely operational severity is Low to ordinary Moderate, primarily affecting driver reliability and memory consumption during firmware recovery.
5. One-sentence report phrase
The iwlwifi MVM recovery path can read beyond a truncated firmware response and leak its response buffer, but no write, disclosure, reliable host crash, or direct remote trigger is established.
6. Manual review recommendation
MANUAL CHECK RECOMMENDED
Confirm whether unprivileged wireless activity can repeatedly induce the recovery command and malformed firmware response, although the currently established primitives do not preserve an Important candidate.
7. Call-site confidence
Call-site confidence: medium
======================================================================
UPSTREAM PATCH SUMMARY
======================================================================
Patch: wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: Fix response handling in iwl_mvm_send_recovery_cmd() [ Upstream
Commit: 9c98ee7ea463a838235e7a0e35851b38476364f2
Upstream URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=9c98ee7ea463a838235e7a0e35851b38476364f2
Changed files:
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/fw.c
Diff excerpt:
Not included in this email. See the upstream URL for the full patch.
Full patch:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=9c98ee7ea463a838235e7a0e35851b38476364f2
======================================================================
DETAILED REPORT METHODOLOGY
======================================================================
The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2024-53059 can be found here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2024-53059
The original CVE announcement normally does not include a security-level
estimate. In particular, it may not contain a CVSS assessment, an impact
level, or enough information to determine whether the reported bug is a
practically relevant security issue. One purpose of this parallel CVE list
is to provide that missing technical and prioritization information.
The original goal of the AL-KERNEL project was to prioritize Linux kernel
CVE analysis automatically before manual review. The system can also help
identify non-security issues that may be suitable for automatic closure.
This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel
vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin.
The first analysis stage combines an autonomous classifier with additional
LLM-based analysis. The autonomous classifier runs locally on a CPU and is
based on a backpropagation neural network. Together, these mechanisms
produce a technical vulnerability description, identify likely weakness
types, estimate CVSS severity, and provide input for ActionableScore.
Two CVSS estimates are retained because incomplete kernel vulnerability
information often permits more than one defensible interpretation:
Conservative CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
The Best / paranoid CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H
The Best / paranoid CVSS score: 5.3
The conservative vector represents a lower-impact interpretation.
The Best/paranoid vector intentionally represents a plausible upper-bound
interpretation and should not automatically be treated as demonstrated
real-world impact.
CVSS may also need to be adjusted for a particular Linux deployment,
because actual reachability, privileges, enabled kernel configuration,
hardware, namespaces, exposed device nodes, and other environmental
conditions can differ significantly between systems.
A separate ActionableScore mechanism evaluates practical remediation
urgency. Its analysis may include reachability, attack prerequisites,
subsystem exposure, memory-corruption characteristics, denial-of-service
reliability, and possible confidentiality, integrity, or
privilege-escalation impact.
Conservative ActionableScore: unknown
Paranoid ActionableScore: 1
The final base severity is taken directly from the second tab-separated
field of the AL-KERNEL classification result. ActionableScore does not
replace or independently override that final AL-KERNEL decision, and
if ActionableScore adjusted impact level of ALKERNEL, then you would see
self-readable flags above like INCREASED_TO_HIGH_BASED_ON_ACTIONABLESCOREHIGHEREQTHAN7.
For an AL-KERNEL result of MODERATE, this report uses the following
additional presentation split:
ActionableScore below 5 -> MODERATE REGULAR
ActionableScore 5 or more -> MODERATE 7.0
The distinction between MODERATE REGULAR and MODERATE 7.0 makes it
possible to identify Moderate issues that should receive manual analysis
and fixes before lower-priority MODERATE REGULAR issues. In many cases,
MODERATE REGULAR fixes may wait for a later rebase or routine update.
There is one override in which MODERATE REGULAR becomes MODERATE 7.0
even when the ActionableScore is below 5. When the AL-KERNEL result
contains the KPANIC flag, a MODERATE result is always presented as
MODERATE 7.0. The KPANIC flag selected with few regexps without
usage of AI at all, so it helps to detect cases when Kernel Crash happens
and similar (to filter False-Negative results from the LLM usage).
KPANIC indicates that a reliable kernel crash, kernel panic, or similarly
serious kernel availability impact was identified by the classification
workflow.
AL-KERNEL base severity for this report: MODERATE
KPANIC detected for this report: NO
Published priority for this report (same as in Subject): MODERATE REGULAR
These results are intended to support engineering triage. They are
machine-generated estimates, and cases marked for manual review should
be validated by a human security engineer before final disposition.
For more info read docs linked from here: https://kernelcve.org/
(and you can submit you own patch there to generate such a report
for non-existant CVE-id yet).
Note that in many cases this AI tool selects higher severity, than
real is (means you can expect Importants instead of Moderate 7.0 or
Moderates 7.0 instead of regular Moderates). If you see such cases,
please use reply email interface to add additional manual analyses
info to this particular CVE.
And please, please, let me know when you see Lows instead of Importants
or Important instead of Low (because particular for such cases I
need to tune this AI tool to make it better for this one and next similar).
My contact email for such notifications is [email protected] (and both
send reply to CVE record itself too and see "reply" button below for howto reply).
reply other threads:[~2026-10-13 1:35 UTC|newest]
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